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Jus Pacis ac Belli? 
Prolegomena to a Sociology of International Law 
Georg Schwarzenberger 
T HE TRADITIONAL SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL LAW is based on the distinction between the law of peace and the law of war. In the forma~ 
tive period of international law, thinkers were fully aware of the problem hidden 
behind this classification. Positivist writers took over these conceptions, framed 
against the background of a philosophical vista of society. Yet in their hands these 
terms lost their original significance. It is the purpose of this investigation to throw 
light on this process and to consider the relevance of this dichotomy into peace 
and war for the positivist and sociological approaches to international law. 
The Naturalist Basis of the Dichotomy 
Conceptions such as peace and war are intimately linked up with ideas on 
the structure of the international society and the motive powers behind it. Nat~ 
uralist writers indicate their attitude towards these problems in their abstrac~ , 
tions from political reality, and, as in our own time, the is and ought are not 
always neatly separated from each other. Reality and utopia often are 
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amalgamated in the picture of the state of nature drawn by these thinkers. 
Whether the "natural condition of mankind" is depicted in darker or brighter 
colors depends on the pessimistic or optimistic, or, if preferred, on the "realis-
tic" or "idealistic" outlook of each individual philosopher. Correspondingly, 
the emphasis changes from war as the natural state of relations between States 
to peace as "a state most highly agreeable to human nature."l 
Hobbes and Pufendorf are typical representatives of the two schools of 
thought. In Hobbes' Elements of Law is a passage which gives the quintessence 
of his view: 
Seeing then to the offensiveness of man's nature one to another, there is 
added a right of every man to everything, whereby one man invadeth with 
right, and another with right resisteth; and men live thereby in perpetual 
diffidence, and study how to preoccupate each other; the estate of men in 
this natural liberty is the estate of war. For war is nothing else but that time 
wherein the will and intention of contending by force is either by words or 
actions sufficiently declared; and the time which is not war, is peace.2 
The opposite thesis finds equally firm upholders and may be illustrated by a 
quotation from Pufendorfs De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libn Octo: 
Now it is one of the first principles of natural law that no one unjustly do 
another hurt or damage, as well as that men should perform for each other 
the duties of humanity, and show especial zeal to fulfil the matters upon 
which they have entered into particular agreements. When men observe 
these duties in their relations one with another, it is called peace, which is a 
state most highly agreeable to human nature and fitted to preserve it, the 
creation and preservation of which constitutes one of the chief reasons for 
the law of nature being placed in the hearts of men.3 
It does not seem accidental that the earlier naturalists were more impressed 
by the reality of the bellum omnium contra omnes than by the utopia of the civitas 
maxima. In the early period of absolutism, the Leviathans found themselves in-
volved in a continuous struggle for survival both on the internal and external 
fronts. The absolutist States were not yet strong enough for the grand strategy 
which required the compact units of greater Powers, backed by a mercantilist 
system of economics and taxation as well as by standing armies of considerable 
size. They were not yet too weak to rely on big and decisive strokes. The unde-
fined medley of war in peace provided the congenial atmosphere for the young 
absolutist State in its fight for survival and preponderance.4 It, therefore, was 
only logical that Grotius entitled his main work De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres; 
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for war appeared to him as the all, inclusive and over,riding phenomenon: 
"There is no controversy which may not give rise to war."s 
Thus, war occupies the central position in the systems of the early natural, 
ists. This statement, however, is open to the challenge that it unduly minimizes 
the intentions of these writers. As it is commonly held, their aim was to limit 
the horrors of war and, as seems to follow from their doctrines on the bellum 
justum, to limit the resort to war. The requirement of a causa justa appears to 
suggest that the normal state of affairs between States is one of peace, depar, 
ture from which is merely permissible in clearly defined cases. Insofar as the in, 
tentions of any writer are concerned, it is hard to furnish convincing proof for 
any thesis. It might, however, be relevant to bear in mind that most interna, 
tiona I lawyers of that period did not have a merely academic interest in interna, 
tiona I law nor were they the equivalent of modem pacifists. They were "men of 
the world," and a good many of them were actively engaged in diplomacy or 
held honorable and honored posts as legal advisors to the very princes whom 
they were supposed to subject to the rule oflaw. Furthermore, all of them alike 
were only too anxious to see their legal propositions accepted by State practice. 
It, therefore, would presuppose a childlike naIvete or a saintly character on 
their part to assume that they either were completely unaware of the power re, 
ality surrounding them or of the concessions which had to be made to make 
their systems acceptable to the powers that be. Yet such considerations can and 
should not do more than to neutralize the Current story,book version of the 
early history of international law. Quite apart from the laudable or deplorable 
intentions of their creators, doctrines must be judged on their own merits and 
by the functions which they fulfil in the reality of society. Once they have been 
propounded, they live a life of their own, and the uses to which they are put de' 
pend on social forces beyond the control of their authors. 
The Ideology of the Bellum Justum 
The two main problems around which naturalist thinking on war centers are 
well brought out in Gentili's definition of war as publicorum armorum justa 
contentio.6 
The conception of war as a public contest merely put into legal form the ob, 
ject of absolutist policy to achieve and to hold the monopoly oflegitimate phys, 
ical force. The memory of the Middle Ages when vassals waged their private 
wars against their overlords, and the central authority merely attempted to 
limit these feuds, was still fresh in the early days of the absolute State. It, there, 
fore, could not be asserted too often that any form of civil war was essentially 
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different from the wars waged between sovereign princes and was, in Bacon's 
words, "like the heat of a fever."7 The intellectual support thus rendered to the 
cause of absolutism could only recommend the doctrine of the bellum publicum 
to the rulers of absolutist States. In this light, the insistence of naturalist writers 
on the need for a declaration of war receives a new meaning. Sovereigns did not 
so much consider this prerequisite of a just war as a burdensome limitation of 
their freedom of action, but as a golden opportunity of transforming their de 
facto monopoly of physical force into a de jure monopoly. The duty of the prince 
to guard the community against the danger of illegal war was bound to 
strengthen his claim to undisputed and exclusive authority in matters of peace 
and war. Duty implies competence, and competence has a tendency towards 
exclusiveness. This aspect of the matter is strongly stressed by Victoria: "Such a 
State, then, or the prince thereof, has authority to declare war, and no one 
else."B Once the absolute State was firmly established, other considerations in~ 
duced sovereigns to forget only too soon this solemn obligation for a declara~ 
tion of war and the requirement fell into general disuse.9 Thus, State practice 
could accept without reservation the plea of the naturalist for the outlawry of 
private war. They were, however, supposed to consult "the good and the 
wise"l0 on the prerequisites of bellum jus tum. What advice had the fathers ofin~ 
temationallaw to offer? It is proposed to limit this examination to Gentili, for, 
with insignificant exceptions, his catalogue of causae justae is typical of the natu~ 
ralist approach to this problem. ll It seems only fair to select this distinguished 
Oxford professor ofItalian extraction as modem jurists claim for him that he was 
the first to place the subject of war on a non~theological basis 12 and that his grasp 
of the doctrine of the bellum justum was even firmer than that of Grotius.13 
According to Gentili, the first group of just wars is provided by defensive 
wars. They include what he charitably terms wars waged for reasons of expedi~ 
ent defence: "A defence is just which anticipates dangers that are already medi~ 
tated and prepared, and also those which are not meditated, but are probable 
and possible."14 It seems as if this all~embracing formula were enough to satisfy 
the most extreme adherent of the reason of State. Yet, obligingly, Gentili does 
not stop at this point. He proceeds to elaborate the grounds which justify even 
offensive wars, and he classifies them under the headings of honor, necessity 
and expediency.l5 In the case of an alliance, a prince is justified in coming to 
the assistance of his ally as long as he is convinced of the justice of his ally's 
cause. If treaty obligations should prove to be incompatible with each other 
and both cases happened to be equally just, "preference should be given to the 
one who has priority."16 Should his disciples still feel any qualms of conscience 
as to the "justice" of their contemplated war, Gentili provides further 
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arguments which even the most scrupulous or least gifted adept of power poli, 
tics could hardly fail to perceive. These considerations are derived from the 
conceptions of subjective and relative justice. A sovereign may be engaged in 
an unjust war, but he may be wrongly under the impression that his cause is 
just. This, Gentili considers enough to exonerate a prince, though the unfortu, 
nate consequence of such liberalism may be that "in nearly every kind of dis, 
pute neither of the two disputants is unjust."17 Finally, a State may have a cause 
which, relatively, is less just than that ofits opponent. But in this case it must be 
remembered that "one man does not cease to be in the right because his oppo, 
nent has a juster cause."18 Thus, "invincible ignorance," as Victoria has called 
this state of mind, 19 is the best keeper of a king's conscience, ifhe wishes to rule 
in accordance with the precepts so ably set out by Machiavelli but equally feels 
bound to engage exclusively in "just" wars of a "defensive" or "offensive" 
character. 
In these circumstances, a naturalist may be forgiven for not always bear' 
ing in mind his own subtle distinctions and for bluntly stating that "by the 
consent of nations a rule has been introduced that all wars, conducted on both 
sides by authority of the sovereign power, are to be held just wars.''20 
It accordingly seems that there is little substance in the time,honored asser, 
tion that the naturalists have subjected war to law, and that rather cynical dis, 
regard of these norms by State practice merely amounts to regrettable 
violations of clearly defined standards. It very much looks like special pleading 
to retort that sovereigns paid their respect at least in form to these rules when 
they attempted to justify their wars of interest in terms of doctrine of the bellum 
justum. In effect, this did not mean that war was subordinated to natural law, 
but that natural law was made subservient to the reason of State . In an interna, 
tional society in which the rulers of States are only responsible to their own 
conscience, an elastic theory with as many loopholes as the doctrine of the 
bellum jus tum was bound to degenerate into a mere ideology serving the inter, 
ests which it was supposed to control. Had the naturalists insisted on more rigid 
standards, their teachings would have been ignored or interpreted out of exis, 
tence. As, in accordance with their "realistic" outlook, they were prepared to 
come to terms with the powers that be, their theories could be turned to useful 
purposes. As Machiavelli reflects, "the people will complain of a war made 
without reason."21 Consequently, rulers are well advised not to ignore their 
home front, and this is the more necessary the wider awake public opinion and 
conscience happen to be. It is equally necessary to break the spirit of the enemy 
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and to mobilize opinion in neutral countries. What could better serve this pur, 
pose than a foolproof case regarding the justice of one's own cause? In the field 
ofintellectual warfare, which is not a twentieth century invention, the author, 
ity of a Victoria, Gentili or Grotius is worth a good many cannons and battal, 
ions, and, as has been shown, it was futile to attempt to apply their doctrines in 
accordance with the requirements of power politics. The implications of these 
theories, however, were still more far,reaching. The naturalists conveniently 
lent their authority to the thesis that some rather disconcerting passages in the 
Gospel on war were not to be taken too literally, and that war, provided that it 
was just, was authorized both by divine and naturallawP Thus, seemingly, the 
naturalists consider war as an exceptional remedy. They do so, however, in a 
manner which does not actually hamper the actual supremacy of force in the in, 
ternational society, and they provide Statesmen with an ideological cover, highly 
appreciated in ages characterized by glaring gaps between the religious and ethi, 
cal standards of individual morality and the requirements of power politics.23 
The conclusions reached so far may be summarized as follows: The natural, 
ists derive their conceptions of peace and war from their vistas of the structure 
of international society either by abstractions from reality or by wishful specula, 
tions on human nature. For the "realistic" school of naturalists, war is the 
over,riding phenomenon, and peace can be defined only negatively by refer' 
ence to war. The object of the "idealistic" school of naturalists to limit war to an 
exceptional remedy is frustrated by their own casuistry. It deprives the doctrine 
of the bellum justum of objective criteria between just and unjust wars and in' 
vites subjectivism and abuse by State practice. Thus, their doctrine degener, 
ates into a mere ideology of power politics. The insistence of naturalist writers 
on the element of bellum publicum in their definitions of war corresponds to the 
interests of rising absolutism, as does their postulation for a declaration of war. 
Therefore, during the period of early absolutism this part of their doctrine 
meets with the full approval of State practice. 
Peace and War in the Modem Doctrine 
and Practice of International Law 
The modem approach to the problem of peace and war is a medley of doc, 
trines and assumptions. They may be discussed under three headings: The doc, 
trine of the normality of peace, the doctrine of the alternative character of 
peace and war, and the doctrine of war as a status and objective phenomenon. 
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The doctrine of the normality of peace and the functions of war. In the leading 
treatises on international law, the order of things, as it appeared to the 
naturalists, is reversed. Jus Belli ac Pacis is boldly transformed into Jus Pacis ac 
Belli. It is mostly taken for granted that peace is the normal state in 
international relations. Only exceptionally a writer condescends to state in so 
many words this "self,evident" assumption. Phillimore, in his Commentaries 
upon International Law, does so with commendable clarity: "We have hitherto 
considered States in their normal, that is, their pacific relations to each 
... other.We have now to consider the abnormal state of things which ensues 
upon a disturbance of these normal relations, when these rights have been 
invaded and these obligations not fulfilled.,,24 
Actually, such an assertion implies views and judgments on the nature and 
functions of war which are far from being self, explanatory. As has been shown 
before, the naturalists found their solutions of these problems by means of ab, 
stractions from reality or deductions from human nature. Modem writers who 
enjoyed the deceptive security of a stable balance of power system as it existed 
between 1815 and 1914, might have held with some justice that they, too, had 
drawn the obvious conclusions from their era of peace. For a generation which 
has witnessed two World Wars in its lifetime, the assumption of peace as the 
normal state of international relations is much more problematical. In a system 
of power politics, war is not an unhappy incident or an incalculable catastro, 
phe, but the culminating point in a rising scale of pressure, the last resort of 
power politics when diplomacy fails to achieve its objects by the threat of force 
or the application of less drastic forms of pressure.25 Thus, this doctrine is 
founded on a complete misinterpretation of the functions of war in modem in, 
ternational society. 
A good many writers have tried to avoid the real issue by remarkable feats of 
escapism. Over and over its has been repeated that war is an event,26 a question 
of fact, 27 or "an international fact in the first degree."28 If this meant that war is 
legally irrelevant, it would prove rather too much; for it would imply that inter, 
national law is not capable of dealing with legal problems arising out of war. 
Rightly, this conclusion is not drawn by international lawyers. This classifica, 
tion of war may mean, too, that war entails legal consequences, but is not capa, 
ble of legal control. 29 To prove this is the avowed or implied object of those 
who interpret war as akin to revolution or as an emergency agency of change. 
How could a legal system attempt to control revolution or effect far,reaching 
changes without elaborate legislative organs in which clearly international law 
is so utterly lacking? As, however, the need for revolution or sweeping changes 
is only apparent in exceptional circumstances, peace may still be considered to 
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be the state of normality in the inter,State system. By the opposite procedure, 
others arrive at the same result. They assert that war is not at all incompatible 
with international law, but comparable to legal institutions such as self,help, 
the right of action, something like the sanction or law of procedure by means of 
which the law of peace is realized.30 
It should not be denied that, in certain circumstances, war is an agency of 
self,help and of the violent adaptation of international society to fundamen, 
tally changed conditions. Yet it would be highly unrealistic to maintain that 
these are the only or even the main functions of international law. The func, 
tions of war are as manifold as the objects of power politics. 
Thus, it appears that neither the self,denying classification of war as a fact 
nor the ad hoc sOciology of international lawyers can furnish proof for the thesis 
that peace is the normal state in international law and relations. In the idealis, 
tic variety of naturalist doctrine, the primacy of peace was logically assured by 
the concept of the bellum. If modem doctrine were consistent, it would have to 
derive its assertions regarding the normal or exceptional character of peace and 
war from the detached observation of the reality of international relations. The 
actual fluctuations between periods of peace and war do not seem to justify a 
doctrine of the normality of peace.31 This assumption, therefore, is nothing 
more than a lingerin~ relic of naturalist philosophy on the nature of man. 
The doctrine of the alternative character of peace and war and the reality of 
State practice. In the systems of naturalist writers, this doctrine is perfectly 
understandable. As they keep reprisals within very narrow limits, and jural war 
depends on a causa justa, "War and peace are correlatively opposite, and what 
is said affirmatively of the one is said negatively of the other.,,32 Thus, Grotius 
can quote Cicero with approval: "Inter bellum et pacem nihil est medium."33 It 
should not, however, be forgotten that even amongst naturalists this doctrine 
was not upheld with unanimity. In the words ofPufendorf,34 "some states more 
expressly denote a relation toward other men than do others, since they signify 
distinctly the mode in which men mutually transact their business. The most 
outstanding of these are peace and war." 
In view of the fact that modem doctrine does not and can not insist on a just 
cause as a condition oflegal war, and State practice has made extensive use of 
military reprisals, pacific blockades, and similar devices, the proposition of the 
alternative character of peace and war as part of modem internationallaw35 re, 
quires to be proved to be believed. It may claim to be in accordance with the 
practice of English courts.36 Their view may be summarized in the words of 
Lord Macnaghten in Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mine~, Ltd.: "The law 
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recognizes a state of peace and a state of war, but ... it knows nothing of an in~ 
termediate state which is neither the one thing nor the other-neither peace or 
war."37 This statement, however, must be read in its context which indicates 
the reason for the rigid adherence of English courts to the doctrine of the com~ 
plementary character of peace and war. It follows from the general attitude 
taken by English courts regarding vital issues of foreign affairs affecting this 
country. These matters are within the prerogative of the Crown, and "it must 
be for the supreme power, whatever it is, to determine the policy of the commu~ 
nity in regard to peace and war .... If and so long as the Government of the 
State abstains from declaring or making war or accepting a hostile challenge 
there is peace-peace with all attendant consequences-for all its subjects."38 
This practice is not derived from the scrutiny of positive international law, but 
is based on a division of functions between the judiciary and the executive, 
considered desirable from the point of view of English law, and it gives expres~ 
sion to the legitimate concern of courts for the certainty of their municipal law. 
It is, therefore, impossible to derive from this practice any conclusions regard~ 
ing the validity of the doctrine of the alternative character of peace and war as 
a doctrine of international law. 
As in the case of the doctrine of the normality of peace, this doctrine could 
derive its only justification from State practice. The foreign relations of all great 
Powers contain frequent instances of resort to armed force short of war or, as 
they are sometimes called, of "pre~belligerent acts."39 Military interventions 
and reprisals, material guarantees and pacific blockades have become such 
household terms of power diplomacy and modem treatises on international 
law40 that it suffices merely to refer to them in order to indicate the problematic 
character of the alternative between peace and war. It cannot be doubted that 
these measures are "tinged with a hostile character"; it is admitted that they are 
"often but the train which awaits only a spark to be kindled into the full blaze of 
open war." Yet it is still asserted that they are "not in themselves inconsistent 
with the maintenance of peace."41 Arguments to the effect that such measures 
merely constitute an abuse of force and amount to war in disguise may be suc~ 
cessful in some instances.42 They do not, however, offer a satisfactory explana~ 
tion of all or even the greater majority of these cases. It is hard to see how the 
limited application of force can amount to war if not only third States but also 
the State against which these measures are taken insists on the continuation of 
peaceful relations with the State resorting to a limited use of armed force. The 
current explanation that, by customary international law, these measures have 
been incorporated into the law of peace, is correct if it means that resort to 
armed force short of war may be lawful in certain circumstances. Yet how can 
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writers who take this line square with their contention the attitude of third 
States in those cases in which they insist on the application of the laws of neu, 
trality to their own relations with the contending States, while the latter insist 
on the continuance of a state of peace between themselves?43 This view leads 
to the paradoxical conception of neutrality in time of peace, not a very pleasant 
constellation for the followers of the doctrine of the alternative character of 
peace and war. This doctrine and the reality of measures short of war can be 
reconciled only at the price of depriving the state of peace of all positive criteria 
and of reducing it to a merely negative status.44 To see peace and war in their 
proper perspective, it is necessary to analyze these states against the back, 
ground of the reality of power politics which is the oveNiding phenomenon in 
international affairs.45 
Powers are in a state of peace with each other when they are prepared to ap, 
ply to their mutual relations the extensive system oflegal rules which is charac, 
terized, e.g., by respect for territorial sovereignty, the freedom of the high seas 
and the exclusion of the use of armed force. In effect, this means that States are 
willing to exercise in their relations merely political and economic, but not mil, 
itary power.46 
Powers are in a state of war with each other and of neutrality towards third 
States, if, subject to customary and treaty limitations, they choose to apply 
against each other Power to the utmost, i.e., military as well as political and 
economic power. 
Modern States in their practice have merely drawn their own conclusions 
from the complete breakdown of the doctrine of the bellum jus tum when they 
consider themselves free not only to change over at will from a state of peace to 
a state of war, but also entitled to the liberal use of limited force.47 It is charac, 
teristic of this state that it does not necessarily lead to the comprehensive use of 
power, as in case of war. Whether the state of peace continues with the State 
against which limited force is applied or not, depends on the latter's decision. 
Similarly, it is left to third States to decide for themselves whether, in their rela, 
tions with the contending States, they prefer the laws of peace or neutrality. 
Even if all States directly and indirectly concerned acquiesced in the limited 
use of force, it appears to be a misnomer to call such a pax bellicosa by the name 
of peace. It is equally unwarranted to call war a state in which both contending 
States insist on the continuation of their peaceful relations, merely because 
third States wish to apply the law of neutrality during such a bellum pacificum. 
These constellations are incompatible with the states of peace and war; they 
constitute a state of their own, a status mixtus. 
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Equally scant respect was shown by State practice to the conception of the 
bellum publicum. Since the beginning of the 19th century,48 States have insisted 
on their right at their discretion to recognize revolutionaries as belligerents, 
and, on less firm ground,49 as insurgents if the insurrection amounted to a civil 
war. Thus, again, State practice found it necessary to build a half,way house, 
this time between the unreserved application of the principle of non, 
intervention in the domestic affairs of other States and the recognition of the 
insurgent government as the government of a sovereign State, a measure con, 
sidered to be illegal during a civil war. If the government against which the rev, 
olutionary movement is directed itself recognizes the belligerency of the 
insurgents, third States are usually inclined to accept the position of neutrals in 
the contest.50 If, however, that government is unwilling to do so, it is left to 
third States to decide for themselves whether they wish to ignore the civil war 
or elevate it into war proper by the recognition of the insurgents as belligerents. 
Thus, we are confronted with another typical instance of the status mixtus; at 
their discretion, States may consider one and the same phenomenon as a do, 
mestic affair, compatible with a state of peace, or as war. 
The conclusion seems unavoidable that, as in the case of the doctrine of the 
normality of peace, the doctrine of the alternative character of peace and war 
cannot stand the test when confronted with State practice. It should be dis, , 
carded as an uncritically accepted remnant of a now merely historically rele, 
vant naturalist approach to the problem of peace and war. 
The doctrine of war as a status and objective phenomenon. Attempts at 
defining war in modern doctrine are dominated by Grotius' definition of war as 
a status or condition: "War is the condition of those contending by force, 
viewed simply as such.,,51 The emphasis on the status of war as the alternative 
to that of peace is congenial to medieval thinking and there finds its legal 
expression in the diffidatio, the message of defiance which severs the tie of faith 
between him who sends it and him who receives it. 52 This conception of war as 
a status equally fits into the naturalist scheme, as naturalist writers consider 
peace incompatible with the use of armed force between States. Apart from 
special treaty obligations, modern doctrine, however, cannot rely on the 
certainty of a declaration of war as an equivalent to the old diffidatio, and, in the 
face of contrary State practice, 53 cannot assert a customary rule requiring a 
declaration of war. Whether, in these circumstances, insistence on war as a 
status means anything depends on the capability of modern doctrine to find an 
objective criterion defining war as distinct from peace and the status mixtus. 
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If modem writers were consistent, they would have to remember in their 
definitions of war their own assumptions of peace as the normal state and of the 
alternative character of peace and war. Such consideration for their own doc, 
trines would necessarily lead them to a definition of war by reference to peace. 
Yet this would be too much to expect. The best of which modem doctrine 
seems capable in relating war to peace is contained, albeit only on the index, in 
a leading textbook: "Peace: see Termination ofWar."54 
Commonly, war is defined as a contention of States through their armed 
forces for the purpose of overpowering each other. 55 At first sight, the element 
of the definition, contention of States through their anned forces, appears to offer 
an objective criterion of distinction between the states of peace and war. Even 
if this could be granted, this definition could not be regarded as adequate, as it 
does not cover two types of war. States, geographically widely separated, may 
declare war against each other and apply the laws of warfare (confiscation of 
property belonging to the enemy State, internment of enemy aliens, etc.) in 
their mutual relations without being able to bring about a contention between 
their armed forces. Or, a State which is at war may deem it prudent to withdraw 
its armed forces in such a way that, again, there is no opportunity for the re, 
quired contention between the armed forces to occur. Instances of the first 
class are provided by the relations between South and Central American States 
and the Central Powers in the First World War and by corresponding situ a, 
tions in the present world war. An example of the second type is offered by the 
Bulgarian withdrawal before the Rumanian troops in the Second Balkan War. 
Yet a still more serious flaw of this definition consists in its inability objec, 
tively to indicate the borderline between war and the status mixtus. States may 
contend through their armed forces, but, as in the case of the extensive battles 
between Russian and Japanese troops on the frontier between the U.S.S.R. and 
Manchukuo, may be unwilling to consider such acts as a state of war. Thus, this 
definition either amounts to the assertion that States are at war with each 
other against their own will, or these cases have to be distinguished from war by 
the introduction into the definition of a subjective element, the animus 
belligerendi.56 Modem doctrine usually chooses this latter alternative as the mi, 
nor evil. This, however, means that not much is left of the so highly coveted as, 
sumption of the alternative character of peace and war and of the apparently 
objective criterion of the contention of States through their armed forces. The 
acceptance of the animus belligerendi reduces the current definition of war to 
the truism that States contending with each other through their armed forces 
are at war with each other if they want to be at war with each other. If one of 
the contending States unmistakably expresses its will, the status of war is 
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created. If, however, the belligerents fail to do so, third States are free to inter~ 
pret at their own discretion the legal significance of "a contention of States 
through their armed forces." 
This failure of modem doctrine is not the fault of individual writers. It is due 
to the impossibility of achieving what modem theorists attempt to do. In a sys~ 
tem of international law which admits the limited use of force to its law of 
peace, or in which there are more than two states of legal relationships as 
pointed out in this article, it is impossible to find an objective criterion which 
distinguishes the status of war both from the status of peace and from the status 
mixtus. 
In these circumstances, all that can be said is this: 
Declared war creates the status of war between the States directly con~ 
cerned and with regard to third States. 
Measures taken within the purview of the status mixtus and of undeclared 
war automatically create a state of war between the States directly concerned, 
and of neutrality with regard to third States, only if the State against which 
these measures are taken, or undeclared war is waged, chooses to consider such 
action as amounting to war. In the absence of an unequivocal declaration to 
this effect, third States are free to decide for themselves whether they wish to 
regulate their relations with the contending States in accordance with the law 
of peace or the law of war. 
Thus it appears that, when faced with the concrete task of defining war, 
modem doctrine has to disregard its own assumptions of peace as the normal 
state and of the alternative character of peace and war. The current definition 
of war is incomplete and only seemingly objective. The express or implied in~ 
clusion in this definition of the animus belligerendi either amounts to the im~ 
plicit admission of the status mixtus which is determined by intentions rather 
than acts, or to the unavoidable acceptance of a continuum between peace and 
war which reduces peace to a merely negative status. If the laws of neutrality 
are applied in a state which the "belligerents" consider to be peace, or those of 
warfare in a state which third States regard as peace, this means that there is no 
intrinsic difference between the states of peace and war. The application of the 
laws of peace and war becomes a question of consensus amongst the States di~ 
rectly and indirectly concerned.57 Doctrine based on State practice does not 
and cannot provide objective tests regarding the circumstances in which the 
different sets of rules are to be applied, and the practice of power diplomacy is 
not a promising field in which to look for the initiative in the precise separation 
of measures where the choice is mainly a question of expediency. 
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It appears, therefore, that none of the assertions of the modem doctrine on 
peace and war can be upheld. 
The doctrine of the normality of peace is merely a survival of naturalist 
thought, but is incompatible with the real functions of war in modem interna, 
tional society. 
The doctrine of the alternative character of peace and war, of the same nat' 
uralist origin, minimizes or ignores the reality of State practice which has cre, 
ated rules pertaining neither to those of peace or war, but constituting a status 
mixtus. 
The doctrine of war as a status and objective phenomenon breaks down over 
the reality of the status mixtus. This status is not separated from those of peace 
and war by any objective tests. States contend by power in peace and war. In 
the state of peace, they are limited to the use of economic and political power. 
In the status mixtus, they supplement these forms of power by the use of military 
power. In the state of war, they use all available forms of power. It betrays an 
over,estimation of the difference between political and economic power as 
compared with military power, to imagine that, within a system of power poli, 
tics, there is any qualitative difference between the states of peace and war. 
The traditional division of international law into the law of peace and the 
law of war may be expedient for didactic purposes. The necessary subjectivity, 
however, of the available criteria of distinction between the two, or better 
three, states of typical legal relations between States deprives this classification 
of any claim to scientific sacrosanctity. 
The Distinction between Peace and War in International Conventions 
To round out the picture, it seems worthwhile to examine whether the con, 
clusions reached so far are affected by relevant international conventions. If 
States had desired to create a clear borderline between peace and war, they 
could have achieved this object only at the price of renouncing their claim to 
the use of force in time of "peace." Then war and the use of armed force would 
have become identical, and a clearly discernible criterion of war would have be, 
come available. This truly objective test was used in the Second Hague Con, 
vention of 1907 regarding the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the 
Recovery of Contract Debts. Nevertheless, the Powers represented at the Sec' 
ond Hague Peace Conference were not prepared to abolish the status mixttlS as 
such. This became embarrassingly evident in the discussions of the second 
sub, committee of the Second Commission when the Chinese military delegate 
analyzed the proposed Convention on Compulsory Declaration of War in the 
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light of the then recent Boxer expedition, and suggested a clear definition of 
war. 58 In the words of a contemporary writer, "no one replied to these embar, 
rassing questions. Governments are not loath to have the definition of what 
constitutes war shrouded in mystery; for in the greater number of States pos, 
sessing a parliamentary form of government, the decision to make war is 
hedged about with formalities and special constitutional requirements, and 
governments have in the past and are likely in the future to find it convenient 
for reasons of domestic and foreign policy to resort to measures of war while 
maintaining that no war exists.59 Thus, again, the term "hostilities," which is 
used in this convention, really means acts of armed force carried out with the 
intent of war, and the door is kept wide open for undeclared war developing out 
of measures taken within the purview or under the cover of the status mixtus.60 
Equally instructive are the attempts made in the post' 1919 period to distin, 
guish between legal and illegal wars. In the Covenant of the League of Nations, 
terms such as war, threat of war, resort to war and acts of war are freely used. 
This question has received so much attention61 that it only seems necessary to 
emphasize the aspects particularly relevant to our discussion. 
President Wilson's drafts make it obvious that he was fully aware of the dan, 
gers threatening his scheme if the status mixtus should be allowed to survive. 
Article VII of his various drafts runs as follows: 
If any Power shall declare war or begin hostilities, or take any hostile step 
short of war, against another Power before submitting the dispute involved to 
arbitrators as herein provided, or shall declare war or begin hostilities, or take 
any hostile step short of war, in regard to any dispute which has been decided 
adversely to it by arbitrators chosen and empowered as herein provided, the 
contracting parties hereby bind themselves not only to cease all commerce 
and intercourse with that Power but also to unite in blockading and closing 
the frontiers of that Power to commerce or intercourse with any part of the 
world and to use any force that may be necessary to accomplish that object. 
Yet, in the course of the drafting, Wilson's attempt seriously to curb power 
politics was quietly undone and his formulations were replaced in a 
matter,of,course way by the traditional terminology-"minor ~hanges ... of an 
entirely trivial character."62 
Further support to the view that war in the meaning of the Covenant was 
limited to war in the technical sense, was given by the equivocal treatment of 
the Corfu incident in League quarters and, particularly, by the sibylline report 
of the Committee ofJurists on this matter.63 
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The evasive attitude taken by the members of the League towards the war 
between Bolivia and Paraguay,64 and still more so towards the "war in dis-
guise"65 in Manchukuo, led to a situation in which illegal war under the Cove, 
nant was limited to cases in which the members of the League were prepared to 
say so.66 
Similarly, the use of the term "war" in the Kellogg Pact enables States to ex, 
ercise their full discretion in deciding whether the use of armed force by a State 
or even contentions of States through their armed forces are to be considered 
as wars within the meaning of the pact.67 Furthermore, the United States Sec' 
retary of State himself thought it necessary to affirm in the correspondence pre' 
ceding the conclusion of the pact that each signatory alone would be 
"competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in 
self-defense."68 Thus, again, illegal war was limited to armed contentions be, 
tween States which the signatories cared to consider as such. 
State practice went still further in its obliteration of the few distinguishing 
marks that were left between peace, the status mixtus and war. If, in the case of a 
measure taken within the status mixtus, a State is free to consider such a step as 
an act of war, it can in advance sign away its discretion to exchange the status 
mixtus for that of war. Thus, it is stipulated in the Treaty of Versailles69 that 
measures which may include military reprisals70 should not be regarded by Ger, 
many as acts of war. A similar clause is contained in the Hague Agreements of 
1930.11 In the declarations exchanged January 20, 1930, Germanyacknowl, 
edges that, in case of an intentional default, "it is legitimate that, in order to en, 
sure the fulfillment of the obligations of the debtor Power resulting from the 
New Plan, the creditor Power or Powers should resume their full liberty of 
action." 
Yet even this use of the freedom of contract was surpassed by the 
self,contradictions of the appeasement period. On the one hand, the Powers 
assembled at Nyon upheld the fiction that the Spanish War was not an interna, 
tional war and most of those States refused to grant recognition as belligerents 
. to the insurgents. On the other hand, they did not base the Nyon Agreement 
on the obvious inadmissibility of sinking foreign merchantmen in time of peace. 
In order to enable the totalitarian aggressors to save their faces, they assimi, 
lated these acts of illegal intervention to piratical acts by submarines and air' 
craft of unknown Powers and arraigned the "pirates" for their violations of Part 
IV of the Treaty of London of 1930, i.e., rules applicable in time of war between 
sovereign States.12 
It cannot, therefore, be maintained that the multilateral agreements con, 
cluded in pre,1914 days and during the era of "power politics in disguise" have 
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contributed to the establishment of more solid criteria of distinction between 
peace and war. If anything, they have increased the tendency towards subjec, 
tivism and an unscrupulous abuse of terms. This was the unavoidable result of a 
"statesmanship" which, while insisting on unlimited sovereignty, felt bound to 
make paper concessions to popular demands incompatible with any system of 
power politics. 
Programme for a Sociology of International Law 
It would by far overstep the limits of this article adequately to develop the 
tests by which a scientific analysis of international law would have to proceed. 
In order, however, not entirely to limit these observations to criticism which, of 
necessity, must be destructive, it may be permitted at least to outline the con' 
structive task. 
The starting point must be the fundamental sociological distinction be' 
tween society and community and a realization of the essentially different func, 
tions fulfilled by society and community laws}3 It depends on the degree to 
which a society has integrated into a community, whether and to what extent: 
(1) law can develop its typical function of providing rational rules for the con, 
duct of the members of the group, or this purpose is frustrated by the overriding 
power of "over,mighty subjects" within a group; (2) it can and must be authori, 
tatively determined by persons appointed for this purpose and can be enforced 
against recalcitrant members. 
A comparison between typical social laws, such as the laws imposed by con, 
querors or colonial Powers in the early stages of imperialism, with the rules gov, 
erning relations such as marriage, blood brotherhood or religious communities, 
indicates the two extreme poles. Ultimately, the one is a law of power and the 
other a law of coordination. In the one, power, and, in the other, the common 
task,74 is the decisive factor. Yet actual life seeks compromises between such 
extremes and "pure" types oflaw. Power must be limited even in the interest of 
those who wield it. Men obey better if they obey the rule oflaw and not the rule 
of men. They have an innate vision of justice. What kind of justice will be 
meted out to them depends on the character of the group in which they live 
and on the scope of the value consciousness of their own time. The constant 
trend, however, in any legal system which aims at an approximation to justice 
inevitably appears to be toward reciprocity. If a certain minimum of reciprocity 
is realized, the power behind the law has a tendency to become invisible. This 
situation seems to correspond to the typical make, up of human nature. Man is 
not predominately altruistic, but is prepared to act on the basis of the principle 
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Do ut des, to consider the application of this principle to his own affairs as fair 
and just, and to come to an understanding with his fellowmen on the standards 
by which the quid pro quo is to be determined. In exceptional circumstances, 
man is prepared to give more than he takes. This may be due to inferiority of 
power or to mistake and fraud. Then, reciprocity is achieved merely in a formal 
sense. In the first case, the lacking equivalent is made up by the awareness of 
the hypothetical situation in case agreement had not been achieved or the law 
of power had not been obeyed. In the second case, reciprocity is assumed but 
does not exist in reality. These two examples represent typical social constella~ 
tions. The willingness to forego actual reciprocity may, however, also be due to 
a voluntary self~limitation and self~denial, when reciprocity in a spiritual sense 
is achieved by the consciousness of such sacrifice and its acknowledgment by 
the community. Thus, power, reciprocity and coordination seem to be the 
three constant elements oflaw, and the preponderance of one or the other ap~ 
pears to depend on the type of the group in which law fulfills its specific 
functions. 
International law is a typical social law and a type of social law which does 
not condition, but is conditioned, by the rule of force. 75 Therefore, it is hard to 
conceive a more unrealistic assumption than the one which is the basis of the 
modern doctrine of international law: the normality of peace. The state of 
peace, as it exists between major wars, is nothing but the interval between the 
dynamic periods in which previous systems of power politics undergo a process 
of confirmation or transformation. The peace treaties of Westphalia, Vienna 
and Paris are the Magnae Cartae in which the hierarchy of power achieved dur~ 
ing the wars preceding them has been continuously redefined. As peace is the 
result of force, it requires force to uphold the statics of any peace interval. This 
means that the same Power which has won the war must maintain the peace af~ 
ter the war. Therefore, within a system of power politics, there cannot exist any 
intrinsic difference between peace and war. 
This explains why the law of peace contains so many rules directly related to 
the maintenance and justification of power politics in general and of specific 
systems of power politics established as the result of major wars. The functions 
of such rules are primarily those of an ideology. Norms such as title by conquest 
for the acquisition of territory, or the exclusion of duress as a ground for invali~ 
dating a peace treaty, are in a different category, as compared with those on the 
three~mile limit or on diplomatic immunity. They are still more different from 
those which govern the work of the International Commission for Air Naviga~ 
tion or the organization for the International Anti~Drug Campaign. The first 
category is representative of the law of power, congenial to an international 
500 
Georg Schwarzenberger 
society which is founded on the arbitrament of force. The second stands for the 
law of reciprocity which governs the relations of States in spheres irrelevant 
from the point of view of power politics and in circumstances when threat of 
force is no longer effective because States have already resorted to the ultimate 
means of pressure. The third gives a timid expression to that law of 
coordination which can only find its realization in an international community 
proper. 
It is suggested that the analytical and descriptive work of past generations 
must be supplemented by a sociological analysis of international law as a law of 
power, reciprocity and coordination, and correspondingly as an ideology, real, 
ity and utopia. 
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